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While this view appears plausible, 
it actually contradicts the evidence 
of the last 20 years, which shows 
that banks do not appear to hold the 
minimum amount of equity required 
by regulators. Furthermore, while 
banks are typically highly leveraged 
compared with most nonfinancial 
firms, this doesn’t mean that similar 
forces are not at work when banks and 
nonfinancial firms choose their capital 
levels. To the contrary, empirical work 
by banking scholars supports the view 
that market forces have been an im-
portant determinant of banks’ capital 
decisions since the early 1990s.
Bank capital has been much in the 
news during the recent financial crisis. 
In 2008 and 2009 the U.S. government 
injected $235 billion of capital into the 
banking system as part of the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP).2 And 
in 2009, bank regulators performed 
a full-scale evaluation of the capital 
adequacy of 19 large banking organiza-
tions, ultimately requiring 10 of these 
organizations to increase their capital 
levels.3 While most commentators 
agree that regulatory capital levels are 
too low for large organizations — es-
pecially large organizations that create 
systemic risks — financial economists 
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ank capital has been much in the news 
during the recent financial crisis. In 2008 
and 2009 the U.S. government injected $235 
billion of capital into the banking system as 
part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). In 
2009, bank regulators carried out a full-scale evaluation 
of the capital adequacy of 19 large banking organizations, 
ultimately requiring 10 of these organizations to increase 
their capital levels. While most commentators agree that 
regulatory capital levels are too low for large organizations 
— especially large organizations that create systemic risks 
— financial economists have only recently been paying 
attention to what factors actually govern banks’ capital 
choices. In this article, Mitchell Berlin discusses how 
understanding bank capital decisions over the 20-year 
period prior to the recent crisis can provide insights that 
may help us to evaluate reform proposals. 
After posing the question, “Why 
are banks so averse to raising equity?” 
a recent column in The Economist an-
1 To be fair, theorists often assume that banks 
hold the minimum capital level mainly as a mat-
ter of convenience when they are not primarily 
concerned about the bank’s choice between 
debt and equity. 
2 This total includes capital injected into a range 
of financial institutions, not all of which were 
commercial banking organizations. See the 
report from the Government Accountability 
Office for more details about TARP.
3 See the Board of Governors’ two accounts of 
the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program 
(SCAP).
swers, “The usual laws of corporate fi-
nance do not seem to apply to banks.” 
The reason the column suggests is 
that deposits are insured; so uninsured 
sources of funding (such as equity) are 
relatively expensive. This view is fairly 
widespread, and not just among busi-
ness columnists. Indeed, most theoreti-
cal models of the banking firm assume 
that banks hold the minimum amount 
of equity required by regulation.1 2   Q2  2011 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
have only recently been paying atten-
tion to what factors actually govern 
banks’ capital choices. Understanding 
bank capital decisions over the 20-year 
period prior to the recent crisis can 
provide insights that may help us to 
evaluate reform proposals. (See Some 
Bank Capital Reform Proposals.) 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN
NONFINANCIAL FIRMS
While banks may be special along 
a number of dimensions, in the first 
instance, banks are firms. So to under-
stand bank capital, a sensible starting 
point is to take stock of our current 
knowledge about capital structure 
decisions by firms in general. First, 
some terminology: We can think about 
capital structure in a few equivalent 
ways. Sometimes it is easiest to talk of 
the firm’s leverage ratio, the value of the 
firm’s debt divided by the value of its 
total assets. Alternatively, we some-
times talk of its capital ratio, the value 
of the firm’s equity (or, often in the 
case of banks, some broader measure of 
regulatory capital) divided by the value 
of its assets.4 
The Dynamic Tradeoff Model. 
Capital structure has been an active 
area of research in financial economics 
for the last 50 years.5 Despite inevitable 
differences of opinion among research-
ers, the current consensus is that the  
empirical evidence is consistent with a 
dynamic tradeoff model in which firms 
choose a target leverage ratio to which 
they actively adjust over some period 
of time. Furthermore, alternative views 
in which firm managers make financ-
ing decisions with little or no thought 
to hitting a target leverage ratio have 
received little empirical support to 
date. But even its proponents recognize 
that the standard model has limited 
power to explain firm capital structure 
decisions.6
In the standard model, a firm 
4 Regulators use the term “leverage ratio” to 
refer to the value of a bank’s tier 1 capital over 
total assets. (See Bank Capital Regulation for a 
definition of tier 1 capital and other regulatory 
terminology.) Throughout the text, I will use 
the term “capital ratio” to refer to common 
equity divided by assets and I will specify when-
ever I use some regulatory measure of capital 
or assets.
5 Most accounts of the modern theory of capital 
structure begin with the capital structure ir-
relevance theorem of Nobel laureates Franco 
Modigliani and Merton Miller, who showed 
conditions under which a firm’s capital structure 
does not affect its value. Subsequent research-
ers have systematically examined the effects of 
relaxing these conditions. 
Some Bank Capital Reform Proposals
I
* The various proposals contain extended discussions of the main issues in dispute. Flannery 
views his scheme more as a means of mobilizing market discipline and early regulatory inter-
vention than as a mechanism for recapitalizing a financial system already in serious crisis. The 
Squam Lake group worries that conversion triggers based on the market price of equity will lead 
to market manipulation that would increase instability. It views conversion primarily as a means 
of recapitalizing institutions once the system is already in crisis. 
n addition to the widespread view that banks should be 
required to maintain higher capital levels than under Basel I, 
banking researchers and policymakers have made a number of 
proposals to reform bank capital regulation.
A number of researchers have proposed that banks be 
required to maintain a layer of contingent convertible debt. The element 
common to all versions of this proposal is that when bank capital falls below 
some level, the debt converts to equity, thereby reducing the bank’s leverage 
automatically. Proposals differ in the details of how conversion is triggered. For 
example, in Mark Flannery’s proposal, conversion is triggered when the market 
value of equity falls below a predetermined level. Alternatively, the Squam Lake 
Working Group for Financial Institutions proposes that conversion should be 
triggered only when both the book value of equity falls below a predetermined 
level and bank regulators announce that there is a systemic crisis.*
Other researchers have proposed that banks be assessed a higher capital 
charge based on some measure of their contribution to systemic risk.  This 
approach seeks to address the issue that banks will not take into account 
the costs they impose on other institutions, and ultimately taxpayers, when 
they take risks that increase systemic risk. For example, Viral Acharya, Lasse 
Pedersen, Thomas Philippon, and Matthew Richardson have proposed that 
bank capital requirements (or a systemic risk insurance fee) be partially based 
on a financial institution’s contributions to episodes of severe stock market 
declines. Other researchers have proposed other measures of an institution’s 
contribution to systemic risk; for example, Tobias Adrian and Markus 
Brunnermeier propose that capital charges be based on the covariance between 
an institution’s stock price and those of other large financial institutions.  
It is important to note that contingent capital schemes and schemes 
that impose capital charges for systemic risk are potentially complementary 
approaches. 
6 See, for example, two recent reviews of the 
capital structure literature by Christopher Par-
sons and Sheridan Titman and by Murray Frank 
and Vidhan Goyal. Business Review  Q2  2011   3 www.philadelphiafed.org
chooses its target leverage to balance 
the benefits and costs of increasing 
its debt level. Much of the literature 
has focused on the deductibility of 
interest payments as the primary 
benefit of higher debt: A firm’s interest 
payments to bondholders and other 
lenders are treated by the firm as an 
expense and, thus, lower the firm’s tax 
bill. In contrast, dividend payments 
to the firm’s stockholders are not 
deductible. If this were the whole 
story, firms would choose to be fully 
debt financed. But debt also generates 
costs. A highly levered firm with a 
lot of interest payments can get into 
trouble in difficult financial times. At 
the minimum, a firm may be forced 
to postpone investment projects and 
use all incoming cash to meet interest 
payments. At the worst, a firm might 
actually face default and bankruptcy if 
it can’t pay its creditors. (In contrast, 
postponing or cutting dividend 
payments do not lead to default.) 
These costs are usually grouped under 
the term costs of financial distress. 
Factors That Reliably Affect 
Leverage. Empirical studies that 
cover different time periods, samples 
of firms, and countries indicate that 
a firm’s leverage tends to be higher 
when a firm is larger, when it has 
more tangible assets, and when its 
market-to-book ratio — the value of 
the firm’s stock divided by the book 
value of its assets — is lower. Most 
researchers interpret these factors as 
evidence that concerns about financial 
distress play an important role in the 
firm’s capital structure choice. Large 
firms have more diversified sources 
of cash, and thus, they are less likely 
to face a sudden cash shortfall. A 
firm’s tangible assets include machines 
and inventories, assets that could 
potentially be sold much more easily 
than a firm’s intangible assets: its 
trademarks, its reputation for quality, 
brand recognition, or the accumulated 
knowledge of its workforce. In the 
event of a decline in cash flows, a firm 
may be able to avoid default by selling 
some of its tangible assets. The market-
to-book ratio is often interpreted 
as a measure of the firm’s growth 
opportunities, for example, future 
investment activities that investors 
see as valuable — and, thus, raise the 
firm’s stock price — but which are 
not yet embodied in assets in place. 
When a firm has valuable growth 
opportunities, it may be particularly 
costly when declines in cash flow force 
it to delay new investments.7
In addition, researchers have 
found that a firm’s leverage depends 
importantly on its industry and that its 
leverage is high when the firm’s own 
profitability is low. These factors don’t 
fit as comfortably into the tradeoff 
model.  The importance of industry 
effects simply shifts the inquiry one 
step further back: What is it about 
an industry that explains high or low 
leverage? And while the negative 
relationship between profits and 
leverage can be squared with some 
versions of the tradeoff model, the 
effect is probably best viewed as an 
unexplained empirical regularity.8 
Firms Actively Adjust Toward a 
Target. While firms may have a target 
leverage ratio, factors often shift a firm 
away from its target; for example, a 
sudden increase in sales might increase 
retained earnings, thereby reducing the 
firm’s actual leverage ratio. Since new 
debt issuance is costly, the firm may 
take some time to get back to its target. 
In surveys of chief executive officers 
and chief financial officers, over 70 
percent of the firms report that they 
have either a strict target or a target 
range for their leverage ratio.9 This 
survey evidence is supported by formal 
empirical studies, but researchers 
report widely disparate estimates of 
the speed with which firms adjust, 
with estimates ranging from very slow 
(Eugene Fama and Kenneth French 
estimate that firms adjust at a rate of 
7 to 10 percent per year) to very fast 
(Mark Flannery and Kasturi Rangan 
(2006) estimate an adjustment rate of 
34 percent per year), and researchers 
are far from achieving consensus. 
Furthermore, studies disagree as to 
whether the target is fixed or whether 
it may vary over time in a systematic 
way. 
Most economists would agree 
with the statement, “It takes a 
model to beat a model.” This means 
that to evaluate a particular model, 
researchers compare it to alternative 
models, mainly by asking how well 
7 The reader may note that none of the enu-
merated factors are clearly related to the tax 
benefits of debt. Until John Graham’s work, 
the consensus view was that taxes had limited 
ability to explain firms’ leverage decisions. 
Recent dynamic models have uncovered more 
evidence for the importance of taxes, but 
research continues to suggest that firms do not 
take on as much debt as models would predict. 
See Graham’s article, as well as the literature 
reviews cited in footnote 6 for fuller discussions 
of taxes and capital structure. 
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8 This negative relationship is consistent with 
Stewart Myers’s pecking order model, examined 
in the next section. 
9 See John Graham and Campbell Harvey’s 
article. 4   Q2  2011 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
                                                 
                                                    
                                                  
                                           
                                          
each explains the facts, in this case, 
firms’ capital structure choices.10 To 
date, no alternative to the dynamic 
tradeoff model has found strong 
empirical support. In particular, 
researchers have found only limited 
support for alternative models that 
predict no target leverage ratio. The 
most influential of these is Stewart 
Myers’s pecking-order model, in which 
firms finance investments out of cash 
whenever possible, sell debt only if cash 
flows are too low, and sell new equity 
only as a last resort.  According to this 
view, a firm’s leverage ratio increases 
when its cash flows drop and it is 
compelled to sell new debt to finance 
expenditures, and its leverage ratio 
declines when cash flows increase and 
internal funds build up. In contrast to 
the assumption of tradeoff models, a 
firm manager in a pecking-order type 
world will make no attempt to actively 
adjust toward some target.11 
Limits of the Dynamic Tradeoff 
Model. The empirical importance of 
industry effects and of other variables 
that might be interpreted in ways 
that have little to do with a tradeoff 
between tax savings and the costs of 
financial distress, for example, firm 
size, firm profitability, or market-to-
book value, limits our confidence 
in the dynamic tradeoff model. 
Furthermore, in an important recent 
paper, Michael Lemmon, Michael 
Roberts, and Jaime Zender highlight 
the limited explanatory power of the 
model. They find that, even including 
industry effects, the traditional model 
explains at most 30 percent of the 
variation in firms’ capital structures; 
an economist would say that the model 
has limited power to explain the data. 
Perhaps more important, Lemmon 
and his co-authors find that firm fixed 
effects have a lot more explanatory 
power than all of the traditional 
factors put together. A fixed effect is 
a persistent factor associated with a 
particular firm: We know it’s there, 
and we know that it helps explain 
the firm’s choice of capital structure; 
we just don’t know what it is. This 
finding is a challenge for the tradeoff 
theory because it suggests that much 
of the variation in firms’ leverage is 
potentially explicable by some model of 
firm decision-making, just not the one 
we have. 
The controversy over the speed of 
adjustment toward the target and the 
stability of the target presents further 
challenges for the theory. The model 
is less persuasive when the speed of 
adjustment is slow; a firm that adjusts 
to its target over a period of 10 or 15 
years begins to look more and more 
like a firm with no target at all. And 
the problem with time-varying targets 
is much like the problem with firm 
fixed effects and industry effects. A 
theory that depends on factors (firm, 
industry, time) that help “explain” a 
firm’s leverage ratio in the statistical 
sense, but without any underlying 
economic intuition, may not be very 
useful as a guide to understanding or 
prediction.12
BANK CAPITAL STRUCTURE
Bank Capital Levels Over Time. 
Banks are highly levered firms. In 
Reint Gropp and Florian Heider’s 
international sample of large banks 
in 2004, median leverage was nearly 
93 percent in book value terms and 
just over 87 percent when measured 
in market value terms. Compare this 
with the median book and market 
leverage of Frank and Goyal’s sample 
of nonfinancial firms in 2004 of 24 
percent and 23 percent, respectively.13 
Bank capital levels have not 
always been so low. In the U.S., com-
mercial banks had equity-to-asset 
ratios (measured at book value) of over 
50 percent in 1840.14 This ratio fell 
continuously until 1945, at which point 
it remained roughly stable in the 6 to 8 
10 Of course, it is possible for different models 
to help explain different aspects of a firm’s 
decision-making or for one model to explain 
decision-making by some types of firms, for 
example, large firms, but not others.
11 See Frank and Goyal’s review article for 
further discussion of the empirical evidence for 
and against the pecking-order model and other 
models that predict no target, for example, 
Malcolm Baker and Jeffrey Wurgler’s view that 
managers’ decisions to issue securities are driven 
by attempts to time the market. 
12 Other recent challenges to the dynamic 
tradeoff model are even more fundamental. For 
example, Xin Chang and Sudipto Dasgupta 
show that simulations with random stock and 
bond selling can generate dynamic capital 
structures that look a lot like a firm moving 
toward a target.
13 That said, banks are not unique in maintain-
ing high leverage ratios. For example, in Ivo 
Welch’s listing of the 30 most highly levered 
firms in February 2006, only 11 were financial 
firms and none were commercial banks.
14 The numbers prior to 1980 come from the 
article by Allen Berger, Richard Herring, and 
Giorgio Szegö. Note that the numbers are not 
strictly comparable over time and so should be 
viewed as an indicator of trends. Business Review  Q2  2011   5 www.philadelphiafed.org
percent range until the 1970s. Exam-
ining the figure at the bottom of the 
page, we see that the weighted average 
book value equity ratios for bank hold-
ing companies (BHCs) had declined 
to the 4 to 6 percent range by 1980 
and then rose to 6 percent in the latter 
half of the 1980s, mainly in response 
to the imposition of uniform capital 
guidelines in 1985.15 (See Bank Capital 
Regulations for a summary description 
of U.S. bank capital regulation and for 
definitions of all terms.)
 Bank capital ratios increased 
dramatically after 1990, when Basel I 
capital requirements were first im-
posed. Book equity-to-asset ratios for 
large BHCs rose from approximately 6 
percent in the late 1980s to over 8 per-
cent in the 1990s and 9 percent until 
the financial crisis of 2008. The rising 
trend since 1990 is even more striking 
in market value terms. The average 
market value of bank equity to the 
market value of assets for the largest 
100 BHCs rose from 6 percent in 1990 
to over 15 percent from 1996 through 
the second half of 2007.16 
Banks Hold More Capital Than 
the Regulatory Minimum. The rise in 
bank capital ratios since 1990 also cor-
responded to an increase in regulatory 
capital ratios. For their sample of large 
BHCs, Flannery and Rangan (2008) 
find that risk-weighted tier 1 capital 
ratios rose from under 8 percent in 
1986 to over 10 percent by 1995. This 
ratio showed a declining trend through 
2006 but remained above 8 percent 
throughout the period, comfortably 
above the 6 percent level required for a 
bank to be considered well-capitalized 
for regulatory purposes and well above 
the regulatory minimum of 4 percent.17
Examining the entire distribution 
of large BHCs’ regulatory capital ratios, 
Flannery and Rangan (2008) show 
that by 1992 more than 95 percent of 
large BHCs had tier 1 capital ratios 
at least 1.5 percentage points higher 
than the regulatory minimum. This 
percentage rises to 100 percent for 
most years through 2001. Berger and 
his co-authors (2008) examine a larger 
sample of BHCs and show that this 
trend continued through 2006.18 They 
show that 99 percent of large BHCs 
had tier 1 capital ratios that qualified 
them as well capitalized in 2006. The 
lion’s share of these firms had tier 1 
risk-weighted capital ratios between 10 
and 12 percent. 
Banks Actively Manage Toward 
a Target. It is clear that throughout 
the 1990s and into the 2000s, banks 
overwhelmingly held capital levels 
greater than the regulatory minimum, 
but this raises a question: What factors 
determine banks’ capital levels? One 
possibility is that the bank capital 
15 A bank holding company is any company 
that controls one or more commercial banks. 
The figure displays bank capital ratios both for 
the largest 100 BHCs and for a larger group of 
BHCs. The figure also displays unweighted aver-
age capital ratios to show that the main trends 
are not driven by a small number of very large 
banks. 
16 Flannery and Rangan (2008) show that the 
increase in the average capital ratio corresponds 
to a rightward shift in the entire distribution 
of market values of equity from the 1986-1989 
period to the 1998-2001 period. The 2008 
article by Berger and co-authors suggests that 
this distribution continued to shift rightward 
through 2006, although they focus on regula-
tory capital.
17 Interestingly, this decline coincided with an 
increase in tier 2 capital. Two trends appear to 
be at work: first, a shift toward riskier assets, 
and second, a shift toward nonequity sources 
of regulatory capital. This raises a range of 
important (and difficult) issues about the ap-
propriate way to measure capital adequacy. To 
the extent that the risk weights on off-balance-
sheet assets (or other assets) were too low — for 
example, regulation may have underestimated 
BHCs’ commitment to support off-balance-sheet 
vehicles — BHCs may not have been as well 
capitalized as they appeared in the early 2000s.
18 Flannery and Rangan’s (2008) sample includes 
the largest 100 BHCs in each year, while Berger 
and his co-authors (2008) use a larger sample of 
































Unweighted Mean of All BHCs
Weighted Mean of All BHCs
Unweighted Mean of
Top 100 BHCs
Weighted Mean of Top 100 BHCs
* The capital ratio is measured as the book value of common equity over total assets.
Source: Bank Reports of Condition. “All BHCs” refers to BHCs with assets greater than $150 million.6   Q2  2011 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
buildup reflected pecking-order behav-
ior and that the capital buildup was 
an accidental byproduct of the strong 
revenue growth for banks during this 
period.  This behavior might have 
been reinforced by regulators’ prefer-
ence to see better capitalized banks.
The evidence strongly suggests 
that this is not the case.  Beginning 
Bank Capital Regulation
P
rior to the 1980s, bank regulators had no formal uniform capital requirements, although regulators 
evaluated banks’ capital levels as a part of their regulatory review. In 1985, U.S. bank regulators imposed 
uniform requirements, largely in response to concerns about the secular decline in bank capital. Banks 
were required to maintain at least a 5.5 percent primary capital ratio — equity plus loan-loss reserves/
total assets — and a 6.0 percent secondary capital ratio — primary capital plus various subordinated debt 
instruments/total assets.
The Basel Accord of 1988 first imposed binding capital requirements in 1990, although these were phased in 
over the next two years. The goals of the Basel Accord were to: (i) raise capital levels for most banks; (ii) increase 
international uniformity in regulatory capital standards; (iii) adjust capital requirements to better reflect actual credit 
risk; and (iv) impose capital requirements for some off-balance-sheet exposures. The following provides the basic 
elements of Basel I capital requirements. (See, for example, Anthony Saunders and Marcia Millon Cornett’s textbook 
for a more complete treatment.) European (but not U.S.) banks have been subject to Basel II capital requirements since 
2008.
Tier 1 capital = Common equity + Preferred noncumulative stock + Minority interests in consolidated 
subsidiaries.a
Tier 2 capital = Tier 1 capital + Allowances for loan losses + Perpetual preferred stock + Subordinated debt + 
Various hybrid capital instruments.b 
Note: The amounts of some of the components of tier 1 and tier 2 capital are limited to some maximum value. For 
example, preferred noncumulative stock can be no more than 25 percent of tier 1 capital.
Risk-weighted assets: Each asset has a risk weight, reflecting the risk of default. For example, a Treasury security 
carries a zero risk weight, while a commercial loan carries a 100 percent risk weight. In addition, off-balance-sheet 
assets, such as commitments to lend, are assigned a conversion factor. For example, an unused two-year loan commitment 
increases on-balance-sheet assets 50 cents for each dollar of the commitment; that is, the conversion factor is 0.5. Total 
risk-weighted assets are the sum of all assets, with each asset weighted by its risk weight.
Each BHC, each bank within a BHC, or any stand-alone bank is subject to three basic capital requirements:
Leverage requirement: Tier 1 capital/Total assets must exceed 4 percent.
Tier 1 capital requirement: Tier 1 capital/Total risk-weighted assets must exceed 4 percent.
Total capital requirement: Tier 2 capital/Total risk-weighted assets must exceed 8 percent.
BHCs that wish to engage in international activities and pay lower deposit insurance premiums, among other 
benefits, must be well capitalized. To be well capitalized, the BHC must maintain a tier 1 capital ratio no less than 5 
percent, a tier 1 risk-based capital ratio no less than 6 percent, and a tier 2, risk-based capital ratio no less than 8 percent.
a Preferred stock confers no voting rights and pays a fixed dividend. Dividend payments on preferred stock must be paid before common stockholders 
are paid any dividends, but contractual payments to debt holders have priority over preferred dividends. Unlike a missed interest payment, a missed 
dividend payment is not an event of default. Unlike for cumulative preferred stock, missed dividend payments on noncumulative preferred stock are 
not added to future dividend payments. When a BHC owns a majority of the shares of a subsidiary, the subsidiary is consolidated into the balance 
sheet of the parent BHC. If the BHC owns less than 100 percent of the shares, the equity share is considered a minority interest in its consolidated 
subsidiary.
 
b Perpetual preferred stock has no fixed maturity and any missed dividend payments are added to future dividend payments. The interest payments 
on subordinated debt instruments are contractual payments that must be paid before any stockholders receive dividend payments. Failure to make 
interest payments leads to default. Subordinated debt has lower priority than deposits or senior debt, so depositors (or the FDIC standing in for 
depositors) or senior debt holders must be fully paid off before subordinated debt holders receive any payments. Hybrid capital instruments included 
in tier 2 capital refer to a range of securities, including deeply subordinated debt instruments. These have lower priority than ordinary subordinated 
debt and make interest payments only under specified contractual conditions.Business Review  Q2  2011   7 www.philadelphiafed.org
                                              
                                        
                                            
                                    
                                      
with a study of the 1980s, Berger and 
co-authors, in their 2008 paper, find 
that banks sold new equity when 
their earnings increased, a finding 
at odds with pecking-order behavior. 
Examining the capital buildup of the 
1990s, Berger and co-authors find that 
BHCs systematically offset new equity 
issues carried out to finance merg-
ers by redeeming existing shares, also 
consistent with active management of 
their capital ratios. Furthermore, Flan-
nery and Rangan (2008) estimate an 
empirical model of bank market capital 
ratios for the 1990s and conclude that 
the mechanical effect of increases in 
earnings accounts for only 3 percent of 
the capital buildup in the 1990s. So, as 
in the literature for nonfinancial firms, 
researchers do not find much sup-
port for pecking-order models of bank 
capital.
What Do We Know About 
Banks’ Target Leverage? It is im-
portant to note that the literature on 
what determines banks’ target leverage 
ratios is relatively small, the samples 
and model specifications are different, 
and not all findings are consistent; 
so all results should be regarded as 
preliminary.19 I focus primarily on 
those results that are consistent across 
studies and that pertain to leverage 
ratios or capital ratios (common equity/
assets) measured at market prices.20  
Consistent with the literature on 
nonfinancial firms — and also with 
many other studies in the banking 
literature — all researchers find a 
positive relationship between banks’ 
asset size and target leverage. That is, 
larger banks are less well capitalized. 
This finding is consistent with the 
view that larger banks are better 
diversified and less likely to breach 
their target leverage.21 Also in line 
with the previous capital structure 
literature, researchers find that most 
of their models’ explanatory power 
comes from a firm-specific fixed effect, 
again, a reflection of our limited 
understanding of the cross-sectional 
variation in bank capital structure 
choices. Existing research also agrees 
that banks adjust quickly toward 
their target; indeed, the adjustment 
speeds exceed the top end of the range 
previously estimated for nonfinancial 
firms.22 
Finally, the studies by Gropp 
and Heider and by Flannery and 
Rangan (2008) document a negative 
relationship between bank leverage 
ratios and a measure of bank asset risk, 
although Flannery and Rangan (2008) 
find this result only for the second 
half of their sample period, 1994-2000. 
This result is consistent with the view 
that bank leverage decisions are driven 
by market pressures; that is, investors 
or other bank counterparties demand 
that a bank with more portfolio risk 
be better capitalized.23 The view that 
market pressures increased in the late 
1990s is in tune with other empirical 
research showing that the costs of 
uninsured funding sources became 
more risk sensitive in the 1990s. 
Interestingly, Flannery and Rangan 
(2008) find no such relationships for 
the 20 largest U.S. banks. They argue 
that market participants view the 
largest banks as too big to fail and 
that this suppresses the relationship 
between risk and leverage.
Researchers have tried to 
distinguish between two possible 
types of explanations to explain 
variations in capital levels over time 
and across banks. The first possibility 
21 It is also consistent with the view that larger 
banks were undercapitalized, in particular, that 
their capital provisions were too low given the 
probability of very bad economic outcomes, 
so-called tail risk. 
22 Interestingly, Flannery and Rangan (2008) 
find that adjustment speeds are faster for banks 
nearer their minimum capital requirement and 
that banks with poor regulatory ratings adjust 
relatively slowly. They interpret the latter result 
as evidence of the difficulties such banks face in 
selling new equity.
23 Flannery and Rangan (2008) do not find a 
negative relationship between leverage and 
risk for the first half of their sample period, 
1987-1994. Their interpretation is that market 
forces became more important in determining 
bank capital structure decisions throughout the 
sample period. We should be cautious in our in-
terpretation of a negative relationship between 
asset risk and bank leverage. Better capitalized 
banks may simply choose to take fewer risks, 
perhaps reflecting the risk preferences of the 
owners or managers.
19 I focus on the results of Berger and co-authors 
(2008), Flannery and Rangan (2008), and 
Gropp and Heider, all of which cover sample 
periods through at least 2000. These articles 
contain references to earlier contributions 
that address similar questions for earlier time 
periods.
20 The leverage ratio is comparable to the mea-
sure typically used in studies of nonfinancial 
firms. Furthermore, regulatory definitions of 
capital pose difficult questions about the quality 
of the capital, for example, whether the instru-
ments included in capital should be thought of 
as equity or debt. And risk-weighted measures 
of assets raise a host of questions about whether 
the risk weightings are reasonable.8   Q2  2011 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
is that regulatory capital requirements 
actually determine bank capital but 
that banks hold some cushion above 
the required capital level to reduce the 
likelihood of a regulatory intervention 
or the need to raise capital or reduce 
assets at short notice. The second 
possibility is that bank capital levels 
are determined in the market, 
perhaps according to some tradeoff 
model similar to the model in the 
standard capital structure literature.  
(Indeed, Gropp and Heider estimate 
a canonical tradeoff model, with only 
small alterations to account for certain 
distinctive characteristics of banking 
firms.) 
To this point, researchers have not 
found a way to persuasively distinguish 
these hypotheses in the data, although, 
in my view, Flannery and Rangan 
(2008) present the most convincing 
evidence against the equity cushion 
view. They show that bank asset 
volatility is not positively related to the 
excess of book capital over required 
capital (the cushion), inconsistent with 
the view that the cushion is chosen 
to protect the bank against the risk of 
poor outcomes that would breach the 
regulatory capital requirement.24 
THEORIES OF BANK CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE
Although there is a large 
theoretical literature on what makes 
banks special, a surprisingly small 
number of banking theorists have 
addressed banks’ capital structure 
decisions. While the empirical 
evidence doesn’t yet firmly reject the 
view that banks hold the regulatory 
minimum plus some cushion, the high 
capital levels of the last 20 years have 
led some theorists to explore optimal 
capital decisions driven by market 
pressures, in the context of the modern 
theory of the banking firm.25 
Banks Hold Illiquid Assets and 
Provide Liquid Liabilities. The high 
leverage we observe for banks is closely 
related to what makes banks special. 
First, unlike those of nonfinancial 
firms, banks’ liabilities are used as 
money (for example, demand deposits) 
and as a safe store of savings that 
can be called on at short notice (for 
example, certificates of deposit). More 
recently, other types of bank liabilities, 
for example, asset-backed securities, 
have served as collateral for a host of 
financial transactions.26 Since liquid 
liabilities are a primary output of 
the banking firm, we should expect 
banks to be highly levered.  At the 
same time, to be useful in exchange 
or as a source of liquid savings, banks’ 
liabilities need to have little risk of 
default and, even more important, 
should not require customers to carry 
out a careful evaluation of the bank’s 
assets. (Imagine having to examine 
a bank’s annual report each time you 
accept a check drawn on that bank.)
Meanwhile, bank assets are risky. 
While a diversified portfolio of loans is 
less risky than any single loan, a bank 
must monitor its loans to ensure that 
portfolio returns are adequate to pay 
off the bank’s depositors and other 
creditors. Besides the view that bank 
capital is determined by regulatory 
requirements, there are (broadly) two 
different views of the role of bank capi-
tal, both of which revolve around the 
view of banks as specialists in moni-
toring borrowers. But the underlying 
mechanisms are quite different.
Bank Capital Promotes Moni-
toring. In a number of models, the 
banker’s incentive to monitor borrow-
ers depends on stockholders’ equity in-
vestment. In particular, recent articles 
by Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti, and 
Robert Marquez, and by Hamid Meh-
ran and Anjan Thakor use this idea to 
explain why banks would hold capital 
in excess of regulatory requirements.  
In these models the banker acts in the 
interests of the bank’s stockholders, 
perhaps because he or she has substan-
tial stockholdings or because his or her 
pay is tied to the bank’s stock price.  
Although the models differ in many 
significant ways, they share a similar 
basic intuition: Stockholders gain 
only when profits are positive, that is, 
when enough loans are repaid to cover 
the bank’s debt payments. The more 
equity invested by stockholders, and 
thus the lower the bank’s leverage, the 
smaller the share of the loan revenues 
that must be paid out to debt holders 
when revenues exceed debt payments. 
Thus, the gains from increasing the 
 
24 This is consistent with the results of Berger 
and co-authors (2008), who do not find any 
relationship between earnings volatility and 
book leverage or any other measures of regula-
tory capital.  
25 Samu Puera and Jussi Keppo’s article presents 
a formal model in which a bank holds an equity 
cushion above its regulatory capital require-
ment. The size of the cushion reflects the bank’s 
costs of securing funds from outside investors in 
the event that it suffers losses.
26 See Gary Gorton’s account of securitization 
and the repo market.
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likelihood of successful loans through 
monitoring are greater when the equity 
investment is greater.
This is only half of the story 
because it doesn’t explain the limits 
on the bank’s equity. In both models, 
the authors simply assume that equity 
is a relatively costly means of funding 
loans, mainly to focus attention on 
the relationship between monitoring 
and leverage. Among other factors, a 
higher relative cost for equity funding 
might arise if (i) deposits are insured; 
(ii) insiders have more informa-
tion about the quality of the bank’s 
portfolio than potential outside equity 
investors; or (iii) we take into account 
the value of producing bank liabilities 
that facilitate exchange.
Each of the models contains 
interesting empirical predictions. In 
particular, Allen and his co-authors 
show theoretically that banks will hold 
more capital when they lend in more 
competitive markets. This prediction 
illustrates an important feature of their 
model: market discipline is imposed by 
borrowers, rather than capital markets. 
Intuitively, borrowers gain when they 
are monitored more closely by banks, 
and banks’ incentives to monitor are 
stronger both when bank capital is 
higher and when borrowers pay higher 
loan rates. Everything else equal, 
borrowers prefer that banks charge 
lower loan rates; so when loan market 
competition is strong, banks compete 
for borrowers by lowering rates and 
holding more capital. When competi-
tion is weak, banks can charge higher 
loan rates and hold less capital without 
undermining their commitment to 
monitor. This prediction has yet to be 
tested empirically.
Mehran and Thakor’s paper has 
a host of empirical predictions, most 
notably the prediction that bank 
equity capital and bank value will be 
positively related in the cross-section. 
Intuitively, a bank with a low cost of 
capital has a comparative advantage in 
monitoring borrowers, and a bank that 
monitors more will have a higher val-
ue. In the cross-section, Mehran and 
Thakor argue that we should observe 
that banks with more equity capital 
will also be more valuable. They find 
support for this hypothesis in their 
empirical analysis of merger deals in 
the U.S. between 1989 and 2007.27   
Deposits Promote Monitor-
ing; Bank Capital Reduces Bank 
Failures. Douglas Diamond and 
Raghuram Rajan present a model 
in which bankers are hired by the 
bank’s suppliers of funds, for example, 
depositors or stockholders, to monitor 
borrowers. In their model, bankers seek 
to grab as large a share of borrowers’ 
payments as they can; that is, bankers 
don’t automatically share a common 
interest with any of the bank’s claim-
ants, either its borrowers or its sup-
pliers of funds. If there were a single 
banker and a single depositor, the 
banker would threaten to withdraw 
his expertise and knowledge about the 
borrower, that is, to stop monitoring 
and force the depositor to accept lower 
interest payments. Since the loan is 
much less valuable without the banker, 
the banker can use his or her threat 
to walk away to capture a significant 
share of the firm’s loan payments at the 
expense of the depositor.28
But things are different if there 
are lots of depositors. Diamond and 
Rajan argue that, in this case, the 
deposit contract has a strong disciplin-
ary effect if, when multiple depositors 
withdraw funds at once, a run on 
the bank develops.29 Faced with the 
threat of a depositor run, the banker 
will choose to monitor borrowers (or 
else the loan will not pay off) and will 
make promised payments to depositors. 
Deposits are hard claims that impose 
discipline on bankers.
If a hard-working banker could al-
ways pay off his or her depositors, Dia-
mond and Rajan’s model would predict 
that banks could be fully funded by 
deposits. The threat of a run would 
impose discipline, but the threat would 
never actually be carried out. But bank 
loans can go bad for reasons other 
than poor monitoring or an attempt 
by the banker to keep loan revenues, 
for example, an economic downturn. 
In this case, the banker may be unable 
to pay off depositors, depositors will 
run, and many loans will have to be 
liquidated inefficiently.
This is where bank capital comes 
in. Bank capital serves as a buffer in 
the event of a decline in loan revenues. 
Equity is a soft claim. In the event 
that depositors withdraw their funds, 
stockholders take a loss to ensure that 
all depositors can be paid off and fewer 
loans have to be liquidated.30 But this 
creates a tradeoff: The better capital-
ized the bank, that is, the more heavily 
27 Using goodwill — the difference between the 
purchase price of a bank and its book value of 
assets — as a proxy for the value of the bank’s 
continuing relationships with its borrowers, 
Mehran and Thakor also predict (and find 
empirical support for) a positive relationship 
between equity capital and goodwill. This result 
is consistent with Flannery and Rangan’s (2008) 
and Gropp and Heider’s finding that a BHC’s 
leverage is lower when its market-to-book ratio 
is higher. 
28 The reader who finds this story too melodra-
matic should view it as a metaphorical way of 
modeling the very realistic conflicts between 
managers and claimants that can’t be easily 
resolved through incentive contracts.
29 For a run to develop, the deposit contract 
must require the bank to pay off depositors who 
want to withdraw their funds on a first-come, 
first-served basis. In the banking literature this 
is called a sequential service constraint.
30 Actually, in the model, bank capital might 
also take the form of long-term subordinated 
debt. It is important that the depositors have 
priority, but in the model, there is no real 
distinction between equity and long-term sub-
ordinated debt. Thus, in Diamond and Rajan’s 
model, market forces would affect regulatory 
capital, not just equity.10   Q2  2011 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
the bank is financed by soft claims, 
the weaker the discipline imposed on 
the banker. Since it reduces the threat 
of a run, bank capital ensures that the 
banker captures a larger share of the 
bank’s profits.
While Diamond and Rajan’s 
model has been quite influential — 
increasingly so, since the financial 
crisis reminded banking scholars that 
banks might actually fail — there has 
been no systematic attempt to test 
whether it helps explain variations in 
bank capital over time or in the cross-
section.31 
CONCLUSION
While the experience of the 1990s 
and 2000s is inconsistent with the 
view that banks hold only the mini-
mum required amount of equity, it is 
difficult to address The Economist’s 
claim that the usual laws of corporate 
finance do not apply to banks. Over 
50 years of theoretical and empirical 
research into nonfinancial firms’ lever-
age decisions has identified factors that 
are consistently related to leverage, 
but one would be hard pressed to say 
that we have a firm understanding of 
the usual laws of corporate finance. 
Empirically, too much of the variation 
in nonfinancial firms’ capital struc-
tures is explained by dummy variables 
representing the firm’s industry and 
the firm itself. While this is better 
than no explanation at all, it is more 
an invitation to further research than 
a settled set of laws. 
Furthermore, while banking re-
searchers have rejected the simple view 
that capital requirements are binding, 
they have only begun to explore the 
determinants of bank leverage deci-
sions empirically or theoretically. For 
example, the banking literature has yet 
to establish convincingly whether bank 
capital decisions are determined by 
market pressures — perhaps includ-
ing pressures from borrowers as well as 
investors — or whether they are best 
explained as banks meeting regulatory 
requirements while holding an extra 
equity cushion.  
While these issues do not directly 
answer the pressing question of how 
much capital banks should hold, they 
are directly relevant to the inquiry. In 
particular, capital requirements are 
much more difficult to enforce when 
they are binding; if banks wish to hold 
less than the regulatory minimum (or 
the minimum plus a cushion), they 
have a strong incentive to evade these 
requirements through a variety of 
strategies. This incentive increases as 
the difference between the regulatory 
requirement and the desired level of 
capital increases. Understanding the 
extent to which market forces are 
working with or against a new capital 
regulation should help policymakers 
understand the costs of enforcement.   
31 Mehran and Thakor argue that Diamond and 
Rajan’s model counterfactually predicts a nega-
tive relationship between a bank’s value and its 
capital level in the cross-section.  B RBusiness Review  Q2  2011   11 www.philadelphiafed.org
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